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666 J. C. PJo;NNEY Co. V. SUP~:R\oR COURT [52 C.2d 
[~. F. No. 20IS:.!. III Bank. Sept. 15, UHiO.] 
.T. C. P~JNNf<}Y COM.PANY (a Corporatioll), Pt't.itiunt'r, v. 
SUPERLOR COlTR1' Oli' :t<'H,ESNO COUNTY, Re-
'spondent; IRENE JOHNSON et al., Real Parties in In-
terest . 
. [1] Mandamus-To Courts: Prohibition-Application of Rules-
Dismissal.-Either a writ of mandate to compel dismissal or 
a writ of prohibition to prevent trial of an action is an ap-
propriate remedy after the five-year period prescribed by Code 
Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an action to trial, has expired. 
[2] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Stipulations . 
Extending Time.-To serve as an extension of the five-year i 
period prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an 
action to trial, a stipulation must be written and extend in 
express terms the time of trial to a date beyond the five-year 
period or expressly waive the right to dismissal. Stipulations 
that "merely extend the time for trial within the five-year 
period, absent a showing that the parties intended otherwise, 
will not extend the period. 
[3] Id.-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Stipulations Extend-
ing Timc.-Stipulations extending the five-year period under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an action to trial are no 
different from other contracts and are subject to the same 
rules of construction. 
[4] Trial-Pretrial Procedure.-With certain minor exceptions 
(Rules for Superior Courts, rules 9, 9.5), the pretrial conference 
is an essential part of the trial procedure in a civil case in 
which a memorandum to set is filed (rule 8). Counsel are re-
quired to complete their depositions and otber discovery pro-
ceedings before the pretrial conference (rule 8.2, as amended) ; 
the efficient functioning of the pretrial procedure drpends on 
such preparation by counsel. 
[5] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Stipulations 
Extending Time.-Though a pretrial conference must precede 
the trial, a valid stipulation extending the time of pretrial 
conference does not necessarily extend the- five·year period 
prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an action to 
trial. 
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 39. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 16 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trial, § 11. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, \:\ 51; I'rcJi.ibitiulI, :;:m; 
[2, 3, 5, 6] HisIJli:3sal, ~ 68; [4, 8] 'frial, § 6.1; [7] 'fl'ial, § 67; [9] 
Dismissal, § 62.5; [10] Dismissal, §§ 66, 67; [11] Dismissal, § 66. 
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[6] ld.-Delay in Bringing Action to Tl'ial-Stipulations Extend-
ing Time.-The filing of :111 amended complaint or the deciding 
of preliminary motions or demurrers may be necessary pre-
requisites to a trial, and a stipulation postponing the time for 
doing either would necessarily extend the time for trial, but 
such a stipulation would not extend the time for trial beyond 
the five-year period prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583, 
absent a showing that the parties so intended. 
[7] ld.-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Computation of Statu-
tory Period.-Code Civ. Proc., § 583, does not contemplate that 
the time consumed in such ordinary proceedings as serving 
process, disposing of demurrers, amending pleadings, waitinl~ 
for a place on the court's calendar or securing the attendanee 
of a jury are to be excluded from computation of the five-yea!' 
period for bringing an action to trial. 
[8] Trial-Pretriai Procedure.-A pretrial conference is merely a 
step, though a vital one, leading to the trial. 
[9] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Effect of Pre-
trial Rules.-The pretrial rules do not affect the operation of 
Code Civ. Proc., § 583, relating to dismissal of nctions not 
brought to trial within five years. They repeatedly distinguish 
pretrial conference and the trial and thus make clear that, in 
adopting a pretrial procedure, the Judicial Council did not 
regard an action as brought to trial by the holding of a pre-
trial conference. 
[10] ld.-Delay in Bringing ActioD to Trial-Duty to Dismiss-
ExceptioDs to Rme.-Despite the "apparently mandatory lan-
guage" of Code Civ. Proc., § 583, requiring dismissal of actions 
not brought to trial within five years after being filed, it is 
subject to certain implied exceptions. Thus, the time during 
which, for all practical purposes, going to trial would be im-
possible, whether because of total lack of jurisdiction in the 
strict sense or because proceeding to trial would be both im-
practicable and futile, must be excluded in computing the ftve-
year period. 
[11] ld.-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Duty to Dismiss-
Exceptions to Rule.-An insufficient stipulation lUay be ma-
terial evidence on the issue whether it was ..impossible, im-
practieable or a futile gesture to bring the action to trial 
within the five-year period prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 583, but even had it been impossible for plaintiffs to go to 
trial during the till1e covered by the stipulation, that ill1-
possibility would be of no !lvail to thPlI1 where nl·ithec part.v 
was prepared for the pretrial conCer('IlI'e (Rules for Superior 
Courts, rule 8.2, as amended), and whl're nearly two mouths 
n'lIlaiul'u nfter discovel'Y pl'oceedings Wl're completed ill which 
plnil1titTf' could h:lve !'let the case for 1\ pretrial cllllferell"" 
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Fresno County from proceeding with the trial of an 
action. Writ granted. 
Stammer, McKnight & Barnum and Dean A. Bailey for 
Petitioner. 
Robert M. Wash, County Counsel, and Floyd R. Viau, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
James K. Kubota and Mikio Uchiyama for Real Parties in 
Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to 
prevent respondent superior court from proceeding in an 
action on the ground that it must be dismissed under section 
583 of the Code of Civil Procedure for plaintiffs' failure to 
bring it to trial within five years. 
Plaintiffs filed the action on December 31, 1953, but did 
not serve the first amended complaint and summons on peti-
tioner until December 31, 1956. Petitioner filed its answer 
on January 21,1957. On December 5, 1957, nearly four years 
after the action was begun, plaintiffs filed a memorandum 
to set the case for trial. Respondent court set the pretrial 
conference for March 21, 1958, and the trial for May 15, 
1958. Before the time set for the pretrial conference had ar-
rived, petitioner and plaintiffs agreed to the following stipu-
lation: 
"Stipulation and Order Continuing Pre-Trial Conference." 
"It is hereby stipulated, by and between the parties hereto, 
that the pre-trial conference in the above entitled action. 
heretofore set for March 21, 1958, may be continued to be 
re-set upon motion of either party in order to permit the 
parties to complete the taking of depositions and discovery 
procedures. " 
"Dated: March 12, 1958." 
Counsel for both parties signed the stipulation and filed 
it on March 12, 1958. Both parties contirlUp.d- to take depo-
sitions and avail themselves of oHler discovery procedures 
until October 1958. Plaintiffs made no attempt to set the 
,('ase for pretrial ('ollference or for trial between October ]958, 
the end of the period contemplated by the stipulation, and 
December 31, 1958, the cnd of the five-year period allowed 
by section 583. Plaintiffs spent this time attempting to join 
CJ 
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another defendant. On January 8, 1959, petitioner moved to 
dismiss the action under section 583. Respondent court denied 
the motion and set the pretrial conference for February 10, 
1959, and the trial for March 2-4, 1959. The parties had sub-
mitted a joint pretrial statement and the court had filed 
a pretrial conference order when petitioner filed its petition 
for a writ of prohibition on February 24, 1959. 
[1] Either a writ of mandate to compel dismissal or a 
writ of prohibition to prevent the trial of the action is an 
appropriate remedy after the time prescribed by section 583 
has expired. (Andersen v. Superior Cottrt, 187 Cal. 95, 97-100 
[200 P. 963] ; Tomales Bay etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 
Cal.2d 389, 392 [217 P.2d 968]; 3 Witkin, California Pro-
cedure 2569.) 
The relevant part of section 583 provides: 
•• Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be 
dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been 
commenced . . . unless such action is brought to trial within 
five years after the plaintiff has filed his action, except where 
the parties have filed a stipulation in writing that the time 
may be extended. . . ." 
[2] Plaintiffs contend that the stipulation signed by both 
parties on March 12, 1958, extended the five-year period 
prescribed by this section. To serve as such an extension the 
stipulation must be written and extend in express terms the 
time of trial to a date beyond the five-year period or ex-
pressly waive the right to a dismissal. (Miller & MU;, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 333, 338 [219 P. 1006].) Stipu-
lations that merely extend the time for trial within the five-
year period, absent a showing that the parties intended other- I 
wise, will not extend the five-year period. (Larkin v. Superior 
Court, 171 Cal. 719, 723 [154 P. 841, Ann.Cas. 1917D 670] ; 
City of Los Angeles v. S1tperior Court, 185 Cal. 405, 412 
[197 P. 79] ; Rio Vista Min. Co. v. Superior C01trt, 187 Cal. 
1, 3 [200 P. 616].) [3] Stipulations under section 583, how-
ever, are no different from other contracts (Smith v. Bear 
Valley etc. Co., 26 Cal.2d 590, 601 [160 P.2d 1]), and are 
subject to the same rules of construction (W oley v. Turk1ts, 
51 Cal.2d 402, 407 [334 P.2d 12]). 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the foregoing rules. Instead, they 
contend that the cases cited must be reappraised in the light 
of the pretrial rules adopted by the Judicial Council for 
the Superior Courts (see 47 Cal.2d 3-9, as amended, 50 Ca1.2d 
71-73), and that the stipulation entered into for the express 
(J 
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purpose of extending the pretrial confer£'ncc necessarily ex-
tended the time for trial beyond the five-year period. [4] It 
is true that, with certain minor exceptions (rules 9 and 9.5), 
the pretrial conference is now an essential part of the trial 
. procedure in "every civil case in which a memorandum to 
. set is filed" (rule 8). It is also true that the rules require 
counsel to complete their depositions and other discovery pro-
ceedings before the pretrial conference (rule 8.2, as amended, 
50 Ca1.2d 71). Indeed, the efficient functioning of the pre-
trial procedure depends upon such preparation by counsel. 
(See Oantillon v. Superior Oourt, 150 Cal.App.2d 184, 187 
[309 P.2d 890]; Kincaid, P"e-T"ial Oomes to Oalifornia, 
30 State Bar J. 414, 417; Kincaid, Pre-Trial Oonference Pro-
cedure in Oaliform'a, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377, 379.) [5] Even 
though the pretrial conference must precede the trial, it does 
not follow that a valid stipulation extending the time of pre-
trial conference necessarily extends the time prescribed by 
section 583. 
[6] The filing of an amended complaint or the deciding 
of preliminary motions or demurrers may also be necessary 
prerequisites to the trial, and. a stipulation postponing the 
time for doing either would necessarily enend the time for 
trial. It has never been held, however, that such a stipUlation 
extends the time for trial beyond the five-year period, absent 
a showing that the parties so intended. [7] On the contrary, 
it has been held that ". . . even though a part of the five-
year period must necessarily be consumed in service of prOCCSf!, 
disposition of demurrers, amendment of pleadings, if neces-
sary, usual and reasonable time consumed in waiting for a 
place on the court's calendar or in securing the attendance 
of a jury and suchlike usual and necessary proceedings; . . . 
the section does not contemplate that time consumed in such 
ordinary proceedings are to be excluded from a computation 
of the five-year period." (Oontinental Pacific Lines v. Su-
perior Oourt, 142 Cal.App.2d 744, 750 [299 P.2d 417].) 
[8] Plaintiffs apparently assume that the pretrial confer-
clIce marks the beginning of the trial in contending that 
,. pre-trial procedure . . . is an integral part of the trial of 
the case." A pretrial conference, however, is merely a step, 
even though a vital one, leading to the trial. [9] The pre-
trial rules do not affect the operation of section 583. Thpy 
repeatedly distinguish pretrial eonfel'ence and the trial al\(l 
thus make clear that in adopting t11e pretrial llt'ocedure the 
Judicial Council did not regard an action as brought to trial 
(~J 
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by the holding of a pretrial conference.1 Despite the addition 
of another step in the necessary proceedings leading to the 
trial, the case must still be "brought to trial within five years 
after the plaintiff has filed his action. . . ." Moreover, the 
stipulation herein did not extend the pretrial conference 
beyond the five·year period. It was filed on :March 12, 1958-
more than nine months before the expiration of that period. 
A case more appropriate for plaintiffs' argument would be 
presented had the stipulation expressly set the date of the 
pretrial conference after the five-year period. Even if such 
a stipulation automatically extended the five-year period 
(cf. Fisher v. Superior COl£rt, 157 Cal.App.2d 126, 131 [320 
P.2d 894], expressly leaving the question open), we have no 
such stipulation here. 
[10] Despite its" apparently maudatory language" (W y-
oming Padfic Oil Co. v. Presion, 50 Ca1.2d 736, 740 [329 
P.2d 489]) section 583 is subject to certain implied exceptions 
(Rose v. Knapp, 38 Ca1.2d 114, 117 [237 P.2d 981] and cases 
cited). Thus, the time during which "for all practical pur-
poses, going to trial would be impossible, whether this was 
because of total lack of jurisdiction in the strict sense, or 
because proceeding to trial would be both impracticable and 
futile" (Chrisfin v. Superior Oourt, 9 Ca1.2d 526, 533 [71 
P.2d 205, 112· A.L.R. 1153]) must be cxclud('d in computing 
the five-year period. (See Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Sll-
perior Court, 28 Ca1.2d 61, 64 [168 P.2d 665] : City of Pasa-
dena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Ca1.2d 908, 916 [207 P.2d 17J; 
Rose v. Knapp, sttpra, at 117; Wyoming Pacific Oil 00. v. 
Preston, supra, at 740-741; Woley v. Tttrk1ls, 51 Ca1.2d 402, 
406-407 [334 P.2d 12] ; see also Vccki v. Sorensen, 171 Cal. 
App.2d 390, 395 [340 P.2d 1020].) [11] Although plaintiffs 
do not explicitly raise the question whetht"r their ease comes 
within this exception, ,,·c havc examined that possibility since 
"an insufficient stipUlation may be material evidence upon the 
'Thus, the rules provide that a case requiring a pretrial conference 
sball be assigned a time for the conference preceding the time of the 
trial (rule 8.1) : tbat the parties need not disclose tbeir witnesses nt the 
conference (rule 8.3); and that the pretrial confer"nee judge shall 8t't 
the time and pJare of trial (rulell 8.4 anti S.l!!). The rules governing 
the comlud of the confer"nl'e (8.3), the scope of t.he pretrial ('onference 
order (8.6) ana the effect of thnt order UpOIl the subsequent course of 
tbe case (8.8) demonstrnte that the conference does not mnrk the be· 
ginning of the trilll. (See also, MWer 4· Lllz. Inc. v. Superior Clmrt, 
192 Cal. 333, 342 [219 P. 1006]; City of Los A7Igeles v. Superior Court, 
I" Cal.2d Hi, 19·22 f98 P.2d 207]; lleier v. Supf'rior Court, 55 Cal.App. 
2d 675, G7G [131 P.2d j;"jol].) 
--.-~~----.--. ----
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issue whether it wa.<; impossiblE', impracticable or a futile 
gesture to bring the action to trial" (W oley v. Turkus, supra, 
at 408). Even had it becn impossible for plaintiffs to go 
to trial during the time covered by the stipulation, since 
neither party was prepared for the pretrial conference (see 
rule 8.2, supra), that impossibility would be of no avail to 
plaintiffs. Nearly two months remained after the discovery 
proceedings were completed in which plaintiffs could have 
set the case for a pretrial conferenc and a trial within the 
five-year period. It is true that plaintiffs spent this time seek-
ing to join a second defendant, but nothing prevented their 
proceeding to pretrial conference and trial against this peti-
tioner while they were seeking to join another party. 
Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., 
Peters, J., and White, J. concurred. 
